(A) When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any other state or territory of the United States, the state registrar may create a new record of birth in the archives upon presentation of a properly certified copy of the final decree of adoption or, if the case has been closed and the adoption decree has been sealed, upon the receipt of a certified statement from the record custodian attesting to the adoption decree.
(B) The decree is considered properly certified when attested by the clerk of court in which it was rendered with the seal of the court annexed, if there is a court seal, together with a certificate of the presiding judge, chancellor, or magistrate to the effect that the attestation is in due form. The certified statement is considered proper when sworn to and having the seal of the foreign state or territory's record custodian.
(C) Upon receipt of the certified copy of the decree, the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, showing:
(1) The date and place of birth of the person adopted.
(2) The new name of the person adopted, if the name has been changed by the decree of adoption; and 14 This Note will consider whether § 1983 does in fact provide an adequate and appropriate recourse to violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and further what usefulness or necessity this procedural posture holds in the future. Part I of the paper will offer a short overview of the history and current state of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and Part II will briefly explain the requirements to bring an action under § 1983. Part III will establish that the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates an individual right vindicable under § 1983, that members of the executive branch are (or at least should be) governed by the requirements of the Clause, and that § 1983 is an appropriate recourse to remedy violation of the Clause by members of the executive. Part IV will then consider the growing necessity for these actions given the blurring of responsibilities between branches of government and especially the increase in opportunities for and occurrences of executive action "giving credit" to out of state judgments.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Read literally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause ("the Clause"), appears extremely broad in its requirement that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial proceedings of every other State." 15 This section of the Constitution is implemented into law as directed by its second article, 16 but is not as a result clarified to any great extent, 17 save for two 14 In the case that eventually became Finstuen v. Crutcher, the Tenth Circuit found an Oklahoma statute unconstitutional because it denied recognition to any out of state adoption by parents of the same sex. 496 F.3d 1139 496 F.3d (10th Cir. 2007 important requirements-that the federal courts afford the same faith and credit constitutionally required of the states, and that acts, records and proceedings shall be given the same full faith and credit in each court in the United States as they would have in the state of the rendering court.
18 However, as Professor Wasserman notes, while the first sentence in both the Constitution and the statute seems to require the same "full faith and credit" of public acts, judicial proceedings, and records, the Supreme Court has long differentiated the amount of "faith and credit" owed to them individually. 19 In Baker v. General Motors Corp., the Court reiterated that there is an "exacting" obligation to afford full faith and credit to judgments of the courts of other states, requiring a decision be given the same effect (both in terms of issue and claim preclusion) in the forum where recognition is sought as it would have in the forum where it was rendered. 20 The same is not true for public acts, 21 which are not due the same deference provided that the law applied to a particular controversy bears a reasonable relationship to that controversy so as to avoid being "arbitrary or fundamentally unfair." 22 This outcome makes sense, as an alternate result would require one state to apply the the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 17 See Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 467-68 (2005 In any case, it is firmly established that to properly recognize a judgment, the recognizing forum must give it the same preclusive effect it would have in the jurisdiction where it was rendered. 24 Baker also makes clear that while the second forum, where recognition is sought, must give the same preclusive effect to a foreign judgment as it would receive in the rendering forum, the method of enforcement is governed by the laws of the recognizing forum. 
II. SECTION 1983
Explaining § 1983 in a few paragraphs is a futile undertaking-there are books and articles written solely on the topic and its application, and countless cases brought under the statute. This Part will offer a basic explanation of the requirements for a § 1983 claim. The statute provides recourse for individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated and allows the injured party to sue for redress. 30 To prevail under § 1983 an injured party typically must demonstrate that a defendant was acting "under color of" state law, and that the defendant's action deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution (or in some cases, federal statute). 31 Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of other remedies available to a plaintiff, meaning that an injured party may file suit in federal court without pursuing the matter in state courts. 32 The statute's requirement that a defendant must have acted "under color of" state law means that the actor in question must have been in the position to commit the wrong due to his position under state law, not that the action was required by law.
33
Another way to view the concept of "under color of" state law is to define it as state action-the federal courts have tended to treat the two as meaning essentially the same thing. In addition to these requirements, the statute has other important contours to consider, such as who may be hailed into court as a defendant and what relief may be granted. Relevant to this Note, unqualified personal immunity from suit for injunction or damages is only enjoyed by legislators-all other state actors may be sued at least for injunction, regardless of the reasonableness of their actions.
40
Members of the executive branch are subject to § 1983 action for injunctive relief at all times, and if they have acted unreasonably or in bad faith they may also be subject to damages. 44 Officials who are seen to act in more than one capacity (such as administrative officials who act in a judicial capacity) do not present much difficulty for the theory of this Note, as the actions I am concerned with are for injunctive or declaratory relief, and members of the executive and judicial branch are subject to such actions. 45 In any case, the Supreme Court has found that where an official is more local and operates in many capacities that blur the separation of branches, this blurring necessitates a diminution of absolute immunity given the indivisibility of the official's actions.
46
In sum, and for the purposes of this Note, § 1983 provides a remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by an official acting "under color of" state law. 47 Actions for injunction or declaratory relief may be brought against members of the executive branch, and to a lesser extent to judicial actors as well. 48 While § 1983 provides many complexities, these generally accepted doctrines are the extent of what is necessary for this paper.
III. SECTION 1983 AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT

A. The Right to Full Faith and Credit
In Adar v. Smith, the majority found that the Clause does not confer a constitutional right that may be vindicated by an action under § 1983. 49 This holding seems to contradict the holding in a recent, related case, as well as express statements by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the holding seems to rely on an overly broad reading of the Court's decision in Thompson v. Thompson. 50 In his brief in support of petition for writ of certiorari, Dean Chemerinsky argues that the Clause satisfies the requirements to create a right that is vindicable by § 1983 action, as set forth in Dennis v. Higgins. 51 The factors taken from that case are " (1) not for this reaffirmation in Thompson, she might be more inclined to find National Securities as an "anachronism," 61 but since the Court saw fit to revisit the conclusion, she had to afford it more weight and could not agree that the Clause allowed the court of appeals to find further rights to exist.
62
It should be noted in response, however, that the excerpted language relied on by the majority and concurrence was initially contained in dicta, 63 and was cited in
Thompson as a qualification to a specific point, not a part of the holding. 64 The Supreme Court has, as noted, expressly stated that the Clause creates an individual right, and has not constrained that statement in its later decisions. In fact, in its decision in Dennis the Court provided a framework for understanding what rights may be guaranteed to the individual by the Constitution.
The Adar majority relied on Thompson as a clear statement that the Clause guarantees no right on which to base § 1983. 65 The majority understood the To summarize, the Clause should be read as creating a right to its guarantee of recognition of judgments, acts, and public records because it satisfies all of the factors in Dennis; the right has been expressly defined by the Supreme Court and not relevantly constrained; and because Thompson is not relevant in cases where the action is between a private party and the state.
B. Full Faith and Credit and the Executive Branch
The en banc majority in Adar v. Smith relies in part on the premise that the Clause operates solely upon the judiciary, and that members of the executive (and presumably the legislative) branches owe no duty to recognize the preclusive effects of judgments from other states. 74 The opinion looks to an article by 255 (1998) . Whitten notes that the original understanding of the Clause was as an evidentiary requirement for courts to take foreign judgments and laws as evidence of their own existence. Id. at 265. In his amicus brief, Dean Chemerinsky notes that the same article goes on to say that the Clause is no longer understood in this way, and Supreme Court decisions have "gone far beyond the original understanding of the provision," so that the Clause should no longer be seen as a merely seeking inter-court comity, but instead to meet its intended purpose of ensuring cohesion between the sovereign states. Chemerinsky Brief at 10-11 (citing Whitten, supra, at 257); Baker, 522 U.S. at 232. 76 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177-78 (saying that no right of action exists under § 1983 because the clauses requirements are only placed upon courts).
77 Adar, 639 F.3d at 152-57. capable of making express limitations on the application of certain provisions. 79 He further argues that it makes little sense to say that the Clause should be read to constrict its own application to the courts without actual mention of them, given its referral to "judicial proceedings" as one of the specific things on which it operates-the framers were clearly able to denote when they wished to have the Clause apply solely to one branch or its actions; where they did not specify, it should not be read in the narrow manner of the Adar majority. 80 The Supremacy
Clause clearly names the "Judges in every State," 81 as under its strictures, providing further justification for the premise that the Framers were capable and willing to limit the application of constitutional requirements to certain governmental entities. 82 This differing language used in different parts of the Constitution counsels in favor of reading the Clause to apply to all branches of government within a state, not just the judiciary.
83
The history and purpose of the Clause also favor its reading as applying generally to all branches, as the Supreme Court has stated that its main purpose is to act as a binding force, stronger than mere comity among the states by imposing a requirement that each state respect and recognize as valid the decisions made by the governing bodies of its sisters in the Union. 84 While this purpose does not necessitate that the Clause apply to the executive or legislative branches, it does agree with that premise-its purpose will almost surely be better served by requiring the entire government of a state to afford recognition to foreign judgments. The opposite conclusion would work against cohesion and result in the type of situation in Adar, where a judgment of one state is not considered valid by another because it was brought (correctly) before a member of the executive branch instead of the judiciary.
Another historical element relied upon by the majority in Adar is that the remedy for violation of the Clause has always been to appeal to the Supreme Court.
85 This is clear direction that the Court reads the Clause to apply only to the 79 Chemerinsky Brief, supra note 75, at 10. The executive branch is subject to the requirements of the Clause because of its broad language and the decisions of the Supreme Court that consider its function to be exacting and important to the cohesion of the Union. Beyond this, the Clause should be considered applicable beyond the judiciary because of the shifting nature of government, and should not be confined in its application by an "accident of history."
89
C. Section 1983 as a Remedy
As stated above, to bring an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity by an individual acting "under color of" state law. 90 The statute applies most often to members of the executive branch who have acted in violation of an individual's rights, and in the case of violations of the Clause, there should be no difference. propositions are correct, then an action under § 1983 for violation of the right to full faith and credit by a member of the executive branch is appropriate. The statute requires a violation of a right by a party acting "under color of" state law, which an executive officer would necessarily be doing when refusing to recognize a foreign judgment. The Adar case is a prime example of this, where the registrar, acting in her position, refused to give full faith and credit to the adoption decree of the New York State courts. The registrar was clearly acting "under color of" the law of Louisiana, and she violated the rights of the men seeking recognition of their adoption decree.
IV. WHY THIS MATTERS
The interpretation of the Clause has not been as contentious as other constitutional provisions that deal more overtly with rights of equality or justice. Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote over half a century ago of it being the "Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," in that its necessity and effects are far more subtle, but no less important, than other parts of the founding document. 93 The one major shift in the Clause's application came in the early part of the nineteenth century. 94 The shift from its use as a rule of evidence to the broader requirements it now mandates was not a dramatic affair, though at least one commentator considers it to have been an error. 95 The Clause has slowly evolved to require similar, though not as exacting, levels of deference to the acts and records of other states to where it stands to today, allowing states to ignore foreign laws or records based on public policy, where judgments must be given the highest deference. 96 This lack of contentiousness about the development of the Clause belies the debate about its use that simmers in the academic community 97 Clause, cases such as the one in Adar seem likely to continue to occur-where a non-judicial actor has failed to afford a judgment full faith and credit, resulting in a violation of the rights of an individual. The reason for this relates to the evolving nature of the federal government and the governments of the several States as they move towards a more efficient model with less separation of power and duty between the branches.
Several noteworthy historical developments illustrate how the Clause's operation has changed over time. As Judge Wiener noted in his dissent in Adar, the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act has been adopted "in all but two or three of the fifty states," 99 serving to streamline the judgment recognition process by allowing a judgment holder to file an authenticated copy of the judgment with an officer designated by the act. 100 Further, Professor Whitten wrote almost two decades ago that the actions of state judges likely differ now from what they were at the time that the Constitution was framed, to the point that they now essentially make laws in the way that only state legislators would have been allowed in the past. 101 In his article mentioned above, Shawn Gebhardt expands upon this idea in the area of Status Records, arguing that the records mentioned explicitly in the Clause now hold a greater meaning in our nation than they may have in the past and should be afforded the same deference as judgments.
102
These are examples of the blurring of the nature of records, acts, and judgments in ways that were likely unforeseen by the founding fathers. This is taking place because of the continued interrelation of the branches of government 98 See, e.g., Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007 the entire process is the purview of the registrar, a purely executive position. In this case the state appears to have put the responsibility upon the executive branch to recognize a foreign judgment. In doing so, the historically recognized posture for attaining full faith and credit (afforded so much importance by the Adar majority 104 ) of filing initially in state court with the only access to federal courts being an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, is essentially nullified-there is no initial court filing and so there is no possibility of eventual appeal. This leaves little recourse other than to file a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief against an executive actor who fails to afford full faith and credit, as the plaintiffs did in Adar.
By disallowing the suit and requiring the plaintiffs to bring action in state court, the purposes of the Louisiana adoption recognition statute, to provide an accurate birth certificate in a timely and efficient manner, were frustrated. The Louisiana legislature had given the responsibility for recognition of a judgment to the executive branch and in doing so had necessarily made recourse for a failure to provide adequate faith and credit suit against the registrar. Since the failure to give faith and credit to the judgment was also a violation of a constitutional right, the correct action for remedy was to file suit under § 1983 in federal court.
In sum, as responsibilities of the branches of government blur, one result may be the necessity to remedy violations of the Clause by members of the executive branch. Section 1983 has historically provided recourse for violation of constitutional rights by state actors and is an appropriate action under these circumstances as well. Unless the Supreme Court chooses to go against its precedent, § 1983 actions should be seen as an appropriate remedy to violations of full faith and credit in the future.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates a right to the recognition it requires, under the three-factor analysis in the Supreme Court holding of Dennis v. Higgins. Further, this right is vindicable by § 1983 action when full faith and credit is withheld by a member of the executive branch who has been properly charged with the recognition of foreign judgments. Finally, it seems likely that as the responsibilities of branches of the government continue to blur,
